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The concept of the best interests of the child is firmly entrenched in international law, the
South African Constitution and South African legislation and jurisprudence. The
Committee on the Rights of the Child has recently declared that it is a threefold concept
existing as a substantive right, a fundamental interpretative legal principle, and as a rule
of procedure. The best interests of the child should be considered, at least, in all matters
concerning children. Yet, in the matter of Le Roux v Dey, where three boys were
defending a delictual claim of defaming their school vice-principal, the judges of the High
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, and eight of the ten presiding judges of the
Constitutional Court did not even mention the best interests of the child. The article
explores some of the possible reasons for this failure and offers some recommendations as to
what a more preferable approach would have been in the circumstances.
I INTRODUCTION
The ‘best interests of the child’ is not a new concept. A search of the law
reports reveals that South African courts considered the interests of the child
as early as 1893,1 and have consistently regarded it as a concept of paramount
importance in many custody disputes.2 In Fletcher v Fletcher the Appellate
Division conﬁrmed that where custody of children was awarded to a ‘guilty
party’ in divorce matters decided in terms of the divorce law which applied at
the time, the interests of the children had to override the fact that the other
party was the innocent party.3 The concept was unequivocally established in
* I am grateful to Professors Sonia Human and Yusef Waghid for their valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this article. All opinions and any errors are, however,
my own.
† BALLB LLM (Stell).
1 Alexander v Alexander 1893 Hertzog 183 (Supreme Court of the Transvaal). See
also Susannah MW Smith v JP Waller and R Bowlby, Executors Testamentary in Estate of
Late John Smith (1879–1880) 1NLR 81 referring to the ‘interests of anyminors’.
2 See for example Cronje v Cronje 1907 TS 871 at 872; Tabb v Tabb 1909 TS 1033,
where the court stated that ‘the guiding principle to be borne in mind is not what are
the feelings of the parents, but what is best for the children’; and Ramsay v Ramsay
1935 SR 84 where the court stated that it ‘would always assume the parents would
have the best interests of the child at heart, and are not likely to make any arrange-
ments as to custody which would not be in the interests of the child’. See furthermore
Matthews v Haswari 1937WLD 110 at 111; Christian v Christian 1945 TPD 434 at 438.
In England the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925 provided that the welfare of the
infant was to be the ﬁrst and paramount consideration for the court in deciding a
question of the custody or upbringing of the infant. Many South African judges
regarded this to be statutory conﬁrmation of the ‘previous practice’ in England and of
the common law position in South Africa. See for example Schreiner JA in Fletcher v
Fletcher 1948 (1) SA130 (A) at 144–5.
3 Fletcher v Fletcher supra note 2 at 134.
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international law when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959 and agreed that the best
interests of the child was to be ‘the paramount consideration’whenever laws
were enacted to provide special protection to children.4 The 1989 Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’) introduced it as a new principle of
interpretation in international law5 along with recognition of the evolving
capacities of the child.6 Article 3 of the CRC stipulates that the best interests
of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning
children, whether these are undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies. By
employing these measures of interpretation, the CRC departed from the
traditional welfare approach to children and conﬁrmed the rights-based
approach, in terms of which a child is regarded as an individual being7
entitled to a full range of human rights.8 The Convention remoulded the best
interests principle9 from a principle of compassion to one of interpretation
which has to be considered in all actions concerning children.10 In May 2013
the Committee on the Rights of the Child ﬁnally provided some much
anticipated direction on the best interests of the child by publishing their
fourteenth general comment.11 In their comment the Committee explicitly
states that the best interests principle is a threefold concept existing as a
substantive right, a fundamental interpretative legal principle, and as a rule of
procedure.12 Apart from the CRC, the principle can also be found in The
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (‘ACRWC’),13
which provides even stronger protection in that art 4 requires that ‘[i]n all
4 Principle 2 of the Declaration.
5 Geraldine van Bueren ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child: An evolutionary revolution’ in Trynie Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in
South Africa (2000) 204.
6 Article 5 of the CRC provides: ‘States Parties shall respect the responsibilities,
rights and duties of parents . . . or other persons legally responsible for the child, to
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
present Convention.’
7 As opposed to a ‘becoming’: see in general in this regard Michael Freeman
‘Introduction’ inMichael Freeman (ed) Law and Childhood Studies (2012) 3.
8 Jean Zermatten ‘The best interests of the child principle: Literal analysis and
function’ (2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 483.
9 Van Bueren op cit note 5 at 205.
10 Zermatten op cit note 8 at 493; Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘General
Comment No 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests
taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1)’CRC/C/GC/14 at 4. (Also available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_GC_14_ENG.pdf,
accessed on 3 October 2013).
11 General CommentNo 14 ibid.
12 Ibid at 4.
13 1990, and which entered into force in November 1999. South Africa ratiﬁed
this Convention on 7 January 2000.
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actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best
interests of the child shall be the14 primary consideration’.
Since South Africa is a signatory to both the CRC15 and the ACRWC, it
must adhere to these binding standards. In fact, the principle has been ﬁrmly
embedded in South African legislation: the Constitution stipulates that a
child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning
the child.16 The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 in turn makes 57 references to the
best interests of the child. Section 9 of the Act conﬁrms that the child’s best
interests are of paramount importance, while s 7 of the Act lists a number of
factors to be taken into consideration ‘[w]henever a provision of this Act
requires the best interests of the child standard to be applied’. Section 6
contains a number of general principles which must guide all proceedings,
actions and decisions by any organ of state in any matter concerning a child or
children in general. One of these guidelines consists of a peremptory
provision that all proceedings, actions or decisions in a matter concerning a
child must respect, protect, promote and fulﬁl the child’s rights set out in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the best interests of the child standard set
out in section 7 of the Act, and the other rights and principles contained in
the Act.17
It is evident that the provisions set out in South African legisation provide
a strong and powerful basis for a child-centred approach in all court
proceedings concerning a child. Nevertheless, in the matter of Le Roux v
Dey18 the majority of the Constitutional Court failed to mention the best
interests of the children involved in this matter, let alone considering it to be
of paramount importance in the formulation of its judgment. In this case the
deputy-principal of a school instituted a delictual claim for compensation
from three children who had allegedly defamed him. Eight of the ten
presiding judges of the Constitutional Court, as well as the judge of the
North Gauteng Division of the High Court19 and the ﬁve judges of the
Supreme Court of Appeal,20 did not even contemplate what it would mean
to have regard to the best interests of the children involved in the case. This
article seeks to discuss the decisions of the various courts in this matter,
placing particular emphasis on the different Constitutional Court judgments.
The aim of the article is to discuss the failure of the courts to approach the
matter from the perspective of the best interests of the child. As such, it does
not analyse the courts’ ﬁndings in terms of the law of delict, particularly on
14 Emphasis supplied.
15 SouthAfrica ratiﬁed the CRCon 16 June 1995.
16 Section 28(2) of the Constitution of theRepublic of SouthAfrica, 1996, herein-
after ‘the Constitution’.
17 Section 6(2)(a) of the Children’sAct.
18 Le Roux & others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre
asAmici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA274 (CC) (hereafter Le Roux v Dey (CC)).
19 Dey v Le Roux en andere (GNP) unreported case no 21377/06 (28 October
2008).
20 Le Roux & others v Dey 2010 (4) SA210 (SCA) (hereafter Le Roux v Dey (SCA)).
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the questions of defamation, wrongfulness or damages. The article focuses
instead on the methods employed by the courts on previous occasions where
the principle of the best interests of the child was indeed applied. These
methods are now also to be assessed in light of the direction being provided
by the General Comment of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
While some criticism has been directed against the minority decisions of
Yacoob J and Skweyiya J, which do deal with the best interests principle,21 I
shall argue that their approach was the correct one to adopt in the matter.
Although I do not necessarily agree with the minority’s ﬁnding that the
picture was not defamatory, I argue that the majority judgment of the
Constitutional Court was disappointing because of its failure to develop and
enhance the law, while simultaneously failing to promote the rights of the
child.
II LE ROUX v DEY
(a) The facts22
The facts of the decision are fairly well-known23 but can be brieﬂy
summarised as follows. The plaintiff in the court a quo, Dr Louis Dey, was
the deputy-principal of a well-known school in Pretoria at the time of the
incident. At some point during February or March 2006 he became aware of
the fact that an electronically modiﬁed picture of him and the principal of the
school had been circulated digitally to some of the learners. The image was
also placed on one of the notice boards of the school. The picture was the
creation of a ﬁfteen-year-old boy who, on a Sunday afternoon, having been
inspired by an episode of a television show he had recently watched, decided
to place pictures of the faces of Dr Dey and the principal onto the bodies of
two gay bodybuilders. The boy went to a website apparently dedicated to gay
bodybuilders, found a picture of two naked men sitting next to each other in
sexually suggestive and intimate circumstances, and then attached the head
and face of Dr Dey to one of these bodies and the head and face of the
principal to the other. The school crest was placed on each of the bodies in
the image, so as to obscure the hands and genitals of each of the men.
Hereafter the boy sent the image to two of his friends’ cell phones.
21 One such opinion is offered by Michael Celumusa Buthelezi ‘In dissent: A
critical review of theminority judgment ofYacoob J Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA(CC)’
(2013) 34 Obiter 719–731. There has been much commentary on the decision. See
John Campbell SC ‘Pleading meaning in defamation cases: Le Roux v Dey’ (2011) 128
SALJ 419; Anton Fagan ‘The Constitutional Court loses its (and our) sense of
humour: Le Roux v Dey’ (2011) 128 SALJ 395; J Neethling & J M Potgieter ‘Defama-
tion of school teachers by learners — Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC)’ (2011) 32
Obiter 721; and Jaco Barnard-Naudé & Pierre de Vos ‘The heteronormative observer:
TheConstitutional Court’s decision in Le Roux v Dey’ (2011) 128 SALJ 407.
22 The facts appear from the judgment of Yacoob J in the Constitutional Court
supra note 18 paras 12–20.
23 See too Buthelezi op cit note 21 at 719.
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Unsurprisingly, the now infamous picture went ‘viral’ almost immediately,
and was distributed between both learners and teachers of the school.
Upon the discovery of the picture, the school authorities punished the
three learners by prohibiting them from assuming any leadership positions at
the school, from wearing honorary colours for the remainder of 2006, and by
sending them to detention at school for three hours for each of ﬁve
consecutive Fridays. Dr Dey also laid criminal charges against the three boys.
These charges were resolved through a diversion process in terms of the
Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977, which required that the boys clean cages
at a local zoo as community service. Despite this, Dr Dey, apparently acting
on legal advice, did not accept the apology of two of the learners in the same
way that the principal had, and still felt deprived of his rights. He
consequently instituted a civil claim for delictual damages in the amount of
R600 000 for the injury to his good name and reputation and for the injury
to his dignity.
(b) The decisions in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal
Du Plessis J of the North Gauteng High Court found for Dr Dey and
awarded him an amount of R45 000 in damages for his claim based on
defamation and the claim based on the injury to his feelings.24 In considering
the appeal from the three boys, the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal
(‘SCA’) conﬁrmed the North Gauteng High Court’s decision, holding that
‘even adolescents know where to draw the line between jest and ridicule’.25
The majority also found that the image dealt with Dr Dey’s ‘sexual
orientation in a derogatory manner’,26 ridiculed him and his moral values,
and therefore disrespected his person. The image was found to be defamatory
and the publication thereof wrongful.27 As to the question of damages, the
SCA found that an apology could have impacted on the quantum. However,
the court viewed the attempts at an apology by the children to be suspect,
and took into account the fact that it happened on the advice of a third party,
long after the publication of the image took place. Furthermore, the court
found that the boys, throughout their testimony in the trial court, remained
disrespectful towards Dr Dey and showed no remorse. The majority held
that the children’s view that ‘the plaintiff should not have taken offence at
what they did, and that he should have been content with the disciplinary
steps that had been taken by the school and the community service to which
they had been subjected’ to be an aggravating factor.28 In two ﬁnal short
paragraphs29 the majority of the SCA considered the fact that the appellants
were school children and found that, although ‘the source cannot affect the
24 Dey v Le Roux supra note 19.
25 Le Roux v Dey supra note 20 para 18.
26 Ibid para 19.
27 Ibid para 19.
28 Ibid para 45.
29 Ibid paras 47–8.
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defamatory nature of the statement it might affect the award’.30 It neverthe-
less came to the conclusion that the high court was fair in its award.31
(c) The Constitutional Court decision32
(i) The majority decision33
The majority, for whom Brand AJ penned the judgment, agreed with the
high court and the Supreme Court ofAppeal in ﬁnding that Dr Dey had been
defamed.34 However, the court reduced the amount of compensation to be
paid to the plaintiff to R25 000 and ordered that the three boys tender an
unconditional apology to Dr Dey for the injury that they caused him.35
In ascertaining whether the image was defamatory, the court agreed with
the two-stage objective approach applied by the majority of the SCA.36As to
the question of the ordinary meaning of the image, the court found that the
reasonable observer would associate Dr Dey and the principal with the
indecent situation that the picture portrayed.37 The answer to the second part
of the inquiry was also answered in the afﬁrmative: ‘the average person
would regard the picture as defamatory of Dr Dey’.38 The court could not
agree with the applicants’ contention that the image was meant as a joke or a
30 Ibid para 47.
31 Ibid para 48. In fact, Harms JA remarked that he ‘may have awarded more but
since [his] award would not have been substantially more an interference [could not]
be justiﬁed’. The minority of the SCA, per Griesel AJA, placed emphasis at the
attempted humour by the three children and found that ‘it would be inappropriate in
this case to postulate the reactions of ‘‘ordinary right-thinking persons generally’’,
instead of restricting the inquiry to the microcosm comprising the particular school
community and examining the way in which they understood the picture’ (para 63).
According to Griesel AJA, it was important to interpret the image in the context of
the school, and the intended viewers of the image, namely fellow learners of the
school who ‘immediately recognised the attempt at humour and laughed at the
incongruity conveyed by the picture’ (para 61). He found that Dr Dey failed to prove
that ‘the meaning conveyed by the picture is the one relied on in the particulars of
claim’ (para 63) since the onus was on him to prove that the image could be taken up
in no other light by a reasonable person than that of being defamatory (para 62). He
nevertheless found that Dr Dey’s dignity was impaired and consequently agreed with
themajority of the SCAas to quantum and costs (paras 64–6).
32 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18.
33 Being the judgment prepared by Brand AJ, at paras 82–152 of the decision, in
which Ngcobo CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Khampepe J, Mogoeng J and Nkabinde J con-
curred.
34 Ibid para 83.
35 The order of the court may be found in para 10 of the judgment.
36 Ibid para 89. In para 90 the court held that ‘[b]ecause the test is objective, a court
may not hear evidence of the sense in which the statement was understood by the
actual reader or observer of the statement or publication in question’ (footnote omit-
ted).
37 Ibid paras 97–105.
38 Ibid para 107. This was so since ‘the whole purpose and effect of the association
created by the picture is to tarnish the image of the two ﬁgures representing authority;
to reduce that authority by belittling them and by rendering them the objects of
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schoolboy prank, and therefore not meant to be defamatory, since it found
that the whole purpose of the ‘joke’ was to belittle, ridicule and show
contempt and disrespect for the plaintiff.39 This, it found, would also be the
way in which the reasonable observer would view the image.40 The court,
did, however, concede that it should be taken into account that the image
was created by schoolchildren and that the reasonable observer would ‘accept
that teachers are often the butt of jokes by their learners and that these jokes
must not be taken too seriously’.41 This did not mean, though, that children
are exempted from delictual liability since,42 in the court’s ‘value judg-
ment’,43 these children crossed the line by publishing a hurtful joke.
As to the wrongfulness of the conduct of the children, the court
summarised the recent jurisprudential development in this regard by stating
that
‘(a) the criterion of wrongfulness ultimately depends on a judicial determina-
tion of whether — assuming all the other elements of delictual liability to be
present — it would be reasonable to impose liability on a defendant for the
damages ﬂowing from speciﬁc conduct; and (b) that the judicial determination
of that reasonableness would in turn depend on considerations of public and legal
policy in accordance with constitutional norms’.44
The court continued to explain that in Khumalo & others v Holomisa45 the
Constitutional Court had found that the common law allows for a balance to
be struck between conﬂicting constitutional rights of freedom of expression
on the one hand, and the rights to dignity and privacy on the other. It is
important to note that the court found that the ‘grounds of justiﬁcation are
still not closed’ and that courts ‘may in appropriate cases thus recognise new
grounds or adapt existing grounds to give effect to considerations of legal policy
and constitutional norms’.46 In terms of the latter ground, the court
immediately dismissed the argument by the Freedom of Expression Institute
(‘FXI’)47 that one such ‘rather radical ground based on the alleged right of
children to develop their satirical skills’ could be used as a proposed ground of
justiﬁcation.48 This was so since the argument was never pleaded or raised in
any manner or form at the trial, and, in any event, derived ‘no support from
contempt and disrespect; and to subject these two ﬁgures of authority to ridicule in
the eyes of the observers whowould predominantly be learners at the school’.
39 Ibid paras 110–14.
40 Ibid para 115.
41 Ibid para 117.
42 The court in para 118 illustrated this point by explaining that if a child were to,
for example, cause physical damage to a teacher’s car, he would still be liable for the
damages.
43 Ibid para 119.
44 Ibid para 122 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
45 2002 (5) SA401 (CC) paras 43–4.
46 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18 para 73 (emphasis supplied).
47 The Freedom of Expression Institute was admitted as amicus curiae.
48 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18 para 127.
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our law as it stands’.49 Had the argument been properly canvassed, so the
court said, a ﬁne balancing act between the right of the child to freedom of
expression and the right to dignity of teachers would have had to have been
investigated.50
The majority of the Constitutional Court also found that, since the boys
clearly had the intention to humiliate their teacher, they possessed the animus
iniuriandi required for the delict of defamation.51 The applicants did not raise
a defence that they were unaccountable or culpae incapax because of their
immature emotional or intellectual development. They simply alleged that
they were unaware that they were committing a delict and doing something
wrong.52
The majority of the Constitutional Court mentioned the fact that the
defendants in this case were children on only one occasion: in paragraph 152
the majority stated that ‘too little was made of the fact that the defendants
were schoolchildren, as well as the fact that they had already been subjected
to other forms of punishment for the same act in more than one way’. The
court opined that Dr Dey should ‘have taken substantial consolation from the
fact that he had to some extent been vindicated in the eyes of members of the
school community — who observed the picture — by the punishment that
the wrongdoers had already endured’53 and for this reason reduced the
quantum to R25 000.
(ii) The joint opinion of Froneman J and Cameron J54
Froneman and Cameron JJ agreed with the minority judgment in the SCA55
in that they found that the applicant’s defamation claim should have failed.
However, they held that Dr Dey’s dignity claim should have succeeded.
They found that he was not defamed since the facts of this case were not
exceptional: children attempt to ridicule and undermine the authority of
their teachers on a daily basis.56 Because this schoolboy prank had taken place
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid para 128.
51 Ibid paras 132 and 135.
52 Ibid para 134.
53 Para 152.
54 Ibid paras 153–206 of the judgment.
55 See note 31 above.
56 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18 para 158. Cameron and Froneman JJ
explained: ‘What the applicants did here is not exceptional. Every generation of
schoolchildren includes individuals who try to make fun of their teachers, who
attempt to ridicule them and who attempt to undermine their authority. Some of
their peers may laugh at their jokes, or guiltily enjoy the attempt to ridicule and
undermine authority; many others will disagree. But for none of them, we suggest,
would the jokes, the attempted ridicule or undermining of authority made by the
few, in the eyes of the reasonable observer, imply that the teacher is now somehow
someone different to the person they knew, diminished by the attempted joke, ridi-
cule or subversion of authority. And that, we think, will also be the reaction of
teachers, parents and outsiders who come to know of it. The children’s conduct will
be recognised as naughty, or worse, but hardly ever as lowering the public esteem of
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in a school setting where the reasonable viewer would not have taken it
seriously or as a factual averment about the deputy-principal, the image did
not impair Dr Dey’s good name or reputation. Despite the fact that the public
aspect of the right to dignity (that is, Dr Dey’s public esteem or reputation)
was not infringed, Froneman J and Cameron J were of the opinion that the
image hurt the vice-principal’s subjective feelings. In this way Dr Dey’s
dignity was impaired since his self-esteem was violated and he was deeply
affronted by the depiction of him in a sexually compromising position.57
III THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
During the interpretation and implementation processes of the best interests
of the child, a number of practical questions need to be answered. Some of
these practical concerns which courts and academics alike have tried to
address include that of determining who decides what is in the best interests
of a child; whether the proposed outcome should be in the interests of a
particular child in particular circumstances or for all children as a group;
whether the decision to be taken should meet the short, medium or
long-term interests of a child; and what it means to use the best interests as a
primary consideration,58 the primary consideration,59 or as a consideration of
paramount importance.60 The notion of the best interests of the child has
been hailed as evolutionary, responsive, and ﬂexible, but at the same time also
as vague, broad and indeterminate.61 The nature of these descriptors could be
interpreted as posing a danger to the full realisation of children’s rights. They
the teacher. In most, if not all, cases the converse will be true: the offending children
will be thought less of, not the teacher. Everybody would accept that the conduct was
wrong and that the offenders need to be punished, not because the teacher’s public
esteem was probably diminished, but because the children did not measure up to the
public standard expected of them at the school.’
57 Ibid paras 176 and 187–90. Two other aspects of this minority judgment warrant
mention: these two judges also paid particular attention to the arguments raised by
one of the amici curiae in this case, the Restorative Justice Centre. Froneman J and
Cameron J held that their submission that the law be developed in such a manner that
aspects of restorative justice, such as the amende honourable, could be effected, was
met with practical difﬁculties since the matter had already ended up in court. This
minority indicated, however, that it was ‘time for our Roman Dutch common law to
recognise the value of this kind of restorative justice’ (para 197). Yet, they were still
not prepared to adopt the approach of a balance between children’s right to freedom
of expression against privacy and dignity. Although they considered such an
approach, which was adopted by Yacoob J, to be ‘thought-provoking’, Froneman
and Cameron JJ found ‘that in the particular circumstances of this case a more con-
ventional approach accords with the dictates of the Constitution’ (para 153).
58 As provided in art 3 of the CRC.
59 As provided in art 4 of theACRWC.
60 As provided in s 28(2) of the Constitution.
61 R Mnookin & E Szwed ‘The best interests syndrome and the allocation of
power in child care’ in H Geach & E Szwed (eds) Providing Civil Justice for Children
(1983) 8, as cited by R Malherbe ‘The constitutional dimension of the best interests
of the child as applied in education’2008 TSAR 267 at 269.
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could, however, also be seen as providing the concept with enough room to
be responsive to the normative values of the CRC, the ACRWC and the
South African Constitution, and in particular to their implementation in
particular circumstances. So, for example, the Constitutional Court declared
in S v M62 that ‘it is precisely the contextual nature and inherent ﬂexibility of
s 28 [of the Constitution] that constitutes the source of its strength’. Heaton
neatly addresses and summarises many of these questions and uncertainties
when she argues for an individualised, contextualised and child-centred
determination of the child’s best interests.63 This too was the call by the
Constitutional Court in some of its previous decisions where it indeed
considered the best interests of the child.64
The South African courts have also conﬁrmed on a number of occasions
that s 28(2) of the Constitution has expanded the application of the best
interests from the traditional sphere of family law to ‘every matter concerning
the child’. In S v M65 the Constitutional Court held that
‘taken literally, it would cover virtually all laws and all forms of public action,
since very few measures would not have a direct or indirect impact on children,
and thereby concern them. Similarly, a vast range of private actions will have
some consequences for children.’
This has the effect that the concept of the child’s best interests has been
elevated to the supreme issue in any matter concerning the child.66 Yet, it
does not mean that the best interests of children must always prevail, or that
other constitutional rights must be ignored.67 Once again, the Constitutional
Court in S v M provided the necessary guidance in this regard when it called
for an approach which applies ‘the paramountcy principle in a meaningful
way without unduly obliterating other valuable and constitutionally pro-
tected interests’.68
Given the attention to the best interests principle in the sources cited
above, it is peculiar that in various judgments of the high court,69 and the
Constitutional Court decision in Le Roux v Dey in particular, there is no
62 S v M (Centre for Child Law asAmicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA232 (CC).
63 J Heaton ‘An individualised, contextualised and child-centred determination of
the child’s best interests, and the implications of such an approach in the South
African context’ (2009) 34(2) Journal for Juridical Science 1.
64 See for example Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000
(3) SA422 (CC) para 18 and S v M supra note 62 para 24.
65 Supra note 62 para 25.
66 Heaton op cit note 63 at 4.
67 In De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2003 (2)
SACR 445 (CC) para 55 the court held that ‘s 28(2), like the other rights enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, is subject to limitations that are reasonable and justiﬁable in com-
pliance with s 36’.
68 Supra note 62 para 25.
69 See for example the decisions of Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA936 (T); 1998 (2)
SA 675 (T) and Van Zijl v Hoogenhout [2004] 4 All SA 427 (SCA) mentioned by Elsje
Bonthuys ‘The best interests of children in the SouthAfrican Constitution’ (2006) 20
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23 at 29.
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systematic examination or elaboration of children’s rights, let alone the best
interests of the child. Moreover, where children’s best interests are consid-
ered by the courts, it was not clear whether these interests are to be applied as
an independent right, a principle, or a standard. Thus, for example, in
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education70 the Constitutional
Court referred to the best interests of the child as a ‘right which every child
has’.71 In the next sentence, the concept of the best interests of the child is
referred to as a principle.72 In C v Department of Health and Social Development,
Gauteng,73 both the minority judgment of Skweyiya J74 as well as the
majority decision by Yacoob J75 performed a limitation inquiry and found
that the ‘impugned provisions of the Children’sAct inﬂict[ed] a limitation on
the right in s 28(2), in that they do not provide for adequate consideration of
the best interests of the child’.76 Yet, in Minister of Welfare & Population
Development v Fitzpatrick77 the Constitutional Court referred to the ‘best
interests standard’ and in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Develop-
ment78 it declared the exclusion of same sex life partnerships from adopting
children jointly to be ‘in conﬂict with the principle enshrined in s 28(2) of the
Constitution’.79 The Children’s Act seems consistently to refer to the best
interests of the child as a ‘standard’ to be applied as a matter of paramount
importance. Heaton80 and Bonthuys81 explain that the problem with the use
of mixed terminology is that the content and effect of implementing a rule, as
opposed to a right, or a standard or a principle is not the same. The courts
appear to not have grappled with the true nature of s 28(2) yet82 and, as is
apparent from Le Roux v Dey, are certainly not applying it as a rule.
The CRC has now, however, in its General Comment No 14,83
70 2000 (4) SA757 (CC) para 41.
71 See also Minister of Welfare & Population Development v Fitzpatrick supra note 64
where the court stated that s 28(2) of the Constitution ‘creates a right that is indepen-
dent of those speciﬁed in s 28(1)’ (para 27). See also Bonthuys op cit note 69 at 26–9
where the author discusses some of the cases in which different terminology has been
used.
72 Ibid para 27: ‘The principle is not excluded in cases where the religious rights of
the parent are involved.’
73 C & others v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng, & others 2012
(2) SA208 (CC).
74 Froneman J concurring.
75 MosenekeDCJ, Khampepe J, Nkabinde J andVan derWesthuizen J concurring.
76 C v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng supra note 73 para 27 of
the decision by Skweyiya J. At para 77 the majority found that ‘[i]n this sense, and to
this extent, the laws are not in the best interests of children. They therefore limit the
rights contained in s 28(2).’
77 Supra note 63 para 18.
78 2003 (2) SA198 (CC) para 22.
79 Emphasis supplied.
80 JacquelineHeaton South African Family Law 3 ed (2011) 278.
81 Bonthuys op cit note 69 at 26–9.
82 Heaton op cit note 80 at 278.
83 General CommentNo 14 op cit note 10.
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conﬁrmed84 that the concept of the best interests of the child is a multifaceted
one, existing as a substantive right; a fundamental, interpretative legal
principle; and as a rule of procedure.85 Since it is a dynamic concept,
encompassing a variety of issues which are continuously evolving,86 the
CRC’s comment provides a framework intended to promote a real change in
attitudes towards the respect for the rights of the child. It is not a general
prescription of exactly what is best for a child in a particular situation. The
comment calls for the development of a rights-based approach to promote
the full application of the concept of the best interests.87 Of relevance to this
discussion is the fact that the CRC reiterated that an assessment and
determination of the best interests of the child required procedural guaran-
tees. The justiﬁcation for a decision must ‘show that the right has been
explicitly taken into account’.88 Furthermore it must be explained how the
right has been respected in the decision, ‘that is, what has been considered to
be in the child’s best interests; what criteria it is based on; and how the child’s
interests have been weighed against other considerations, be they broad
issues of policy or individual cases.’89 As a result, State Parties to the CRC
have, inter alia, the duty to ensure that
‘(a) the child’s best interests are appropriately integrated and consistently applied in
every action taken by a public institution, especially in all implementation
measures, administrative and judicial proceedings which directly or indirectly
impact on children;
(b) all judicial and administrative decisions as well as policies and legislation
concerning children demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been a
primary consideration. This includes describing how the best interests
have been examined and assessed, and what weight has been ascribed to
them in the decision.90
It is interesting that even prior to this General Comment, the Constitutional
Court had addressed the question concerning who should raise the interests
of children in court proceedings, particularly in instances where it may have
not been properly raised or argued, in the matter of Van der Burg v National
Director of Public Prosecutions.91 The court came to this conclusion:
‘Of course, it is expected that parents must invoke the interests of their children
in proceedings like these and it is important that they do so. But state
institutions bear a responsibility to address this issue, even when the parents
have not raised it. The high court is not only the upper guardian of children,
84 See for example Zermatten op cit note 8 at 483–99 offering many of the same
views on the three facets of the concept.
85 General CommentNo 14 op cit note 10 at 4.
86 Ibid at 5.
87 Ibid at 4.
88 Ibid at 4.
89 Ibid at 4.
90 Ibid at 5.
91 Van der Burg & another v National Director of Public Prosecutions & another 2012 (2)
SACR331 (CC) para 68.
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Zbut is also obliged to uphold the rights and values of the Constitution. In all
matters concerning children, including applications for the forfeiture of property
which provides a home or shelter to children, it is the duty of the court to consider
the specific interests of the children. In this, ofﬁcers of the court like the NDPP are
expected to assist the court to the best of their ability with all relevant
information at their disposal. The failure of parents to emphasise the interests of
their children, or the possible manipulation of the children’s situation to suit the
objectives of parents, may not be held against the children.’92
IV AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MAJORITY DECISION
When one considers the explicit injunctions set out by the court in the Van
der Burg case, two important questions need to be asked. Why did the
majority of the Constitutional Court (as well as the Gauteng North High
Court and the SCA) consider it unnecessary to consider how these defendant
children’s best interests could be served? By contrast, how should the courts
instead have approached the matter?
Neither one of these questions is easy to answer. One may only speculate
as to why the courts failed to consider these children’s interests: perhaps it is
because they did not present themselves as innocent children and were not
defended by their legal representatives in this way, and this distracted the
courts from accepting that these children still had substantive rights which
needed to be taken into account. Maybe it was the fact that the particular
circumstances of the case were so unique that it clouded the courts’ vision in
not realising that an appropriate balancing exercise needed to take place.
These were children who had done wrong. They did not quite ﬁt the mould
of the juvenile offender93 who needs rescuing from his or her evil delinquen-
cies. Nor were they the innocent victims of an abuse of power by cruel
adults, in desperate need of care and protection of their welfare and interests.
They were children who thought it would be funny to make fun of their
teachers. It probably was not funny — and it certainly was not for Dr Dey.
His dignity and reputation were most probably harmed and I agree that the
three boys should have been made to bear the consequences of their actions.
The crucial point of departure, however, which was ignored by the majority
of the Constitutional Court, was that the best interests of these children
needed to be considered in the process.
Since any interpretation of the best interests must be consistent with the
spirit of the entire CRC,94 one must be informed and guided by the other
92 Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted.
93 Although their crime had been diverted through the relevant processes offered,
at the time, by the Criminal ProcedureAct.




articles of the CRC95 to ensure that the set of values used by the interpreter is
measured against those values and principles prescribed by international
law.96 Therefore, throughout the process of establishing the best interests of
children, one must also consider some of the other applicable rights of
children as enshrined by the CRC and other international treaties. In Le
Roux v Dey the children should have had their interests assessed as substantive
rights. Such rights would have included their rights to freedom of speech, not
to be discriminated against, to have their voice and opinion heard, especially
in the context of their evolving capacities, and the right to certain procedural
safeguards. I would argue that it was incorrect for the majority of the
Constitutional Court merely to dismiss the ‘rather radical ground based on
the alleged right of children to develop their satirical skills’ as it was not
‘properly canvassed’. 97 It is the duty of the court to raise the question of the
interests and rights of the child in the event that the child’s legal representa-
tive does not do so.98 It is probable that the courts would have found that
these rights of the children could not justify the infringement upon the rights
of Dr Dey. Perhaps the courts would have found that it was in the children’s
best interests that they learn to respect authority and other people’s dignity by
paying delictual damages. Perhaps the courts might have considered other
methods such as restorative justice99 to be more appropriate to promote the
children’s best interests. Perhaps this question would not have needed a
deﬁnitive answer: the CRC merely requires proof that that the right of the
children’s best interests has explicitly been taken into account.
As a result, it is submitted that the ﬁrst sentence of Skweyiya J’s judgment
summarises the approach which was the only possible route from which to
decide the matter in this particular instance. It reads: ‘This is a case
concerning children. In and amongst all the other considerations relevant to
this matter, this is the inescapable and overarching fact of this case.’ 100
The judge also identiﬁed one of the most important questions which need
to be answered: that is, how the best interests standard should be applied in
this type of matter.101 Skweyiya J tried to answer this by drawing on the
95 See also J Tobin ‘Beyond the supermarket shelf: Using a rights based approach to
address children’s health needs’ (2006) 14 International Journal of Children’s Rights 275 at
287.
96 J Tobin & R McNair ‘Public international law and the regulation of private
spaces: Does the Convention on the Rights of the Child impose an obligation on
states to allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt?’ (2009) 23 International Journal of Law,
Policy and the Family 110 at 114.
97 See Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18 para 127.
98 See the quotation from Van der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions supra
note 91.
99 Something brieﬂy considered Froneman and Cameron JJ, as I discussed in note
57 above.
100 Skweyiya J essentially agreed with Yacoob J’s reasoning, but felt it necessary to
provide his own reasons, which may be found in Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18
paras 207–15.
101 Ibid para 211.
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international guidelines on the matter found in the CRC and the Constitu-
tion. He then concluded that the best interests consideration is not some-
thing which is elevated above all other aspects, but rather forms the point of
departure from which the matter is to be considered. He found that only
once the correct starting point is established, can one begin to examine the
other relevant rights concerning the matter, ‘without losing sight of the fact
that the best interests of the child remain ‘‘of paramount importance’’ ’.102
Skweyiya J admitted that he did not condone the children’s actions in this
matter, and he expressed the view that they certainly should have faced the
consequences and be punished for their actions. However, in deciding the
outcome of the case, a ‘judicial ofﬁcer would be remiss if consideration were
not properly given to the effect of one’s decision on the rights of the child’.103
It is this fundamental interpretative legal principle which, it is submitted, the
majority of the Constitutional Court missed when they made their decision.
Using the same line of reasoning as Skweyiya J, Yacoob J104 identiﬁed the
issues in this particular matter to be that of balancing the rights of dignity105
and privacy on one hand, with that of freedom of expression and the rights of
children on the other.106 Yacoob J furthermore subscribed to the approach of
the Constitutional Court in the Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, & others,107 where it was
conﬁrmed that because the best interests of the child are paramount, this does
not mean that they are absolute.108 Here the court too held that s 28
‘imposes an obligation on all those who make decisions concerning a child to
ensure that the best interests of the child enjoy paramount importance in their
decisions. Section 28(2) provides a benchmark for the treatment and protection
of children.’109
It followed, said the court in that case, that courts and reasonable observers
are obliged to give consideration to the effect of their decisions on the rights
and interests of children.110
In order to evaluate the image created by the children, Yacoob J
considered it important to do so within the context in which the facts
occurred, namely a school setting, where the offenders were children, as well
as that the power relationship between the wrongdoers and the target of the
injury.111 After a brief discussion of the importance of freedom of expression
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid para 214.
104 Ibid paras 11–81 of the judgment. For extensive criticism of this decision see
Buthelezi op cit note 21 at 719.
105 This being the right to dignity not only of Dr Dey but also of the children
involved. See ibid para 46.
106 See ibid paras 32, 35 and 44.
107 2009 (4) SA222 (CC) (hereafter the Phaswane case).
108 Paras 71–80.
109 Para 73 of the Phaswane decision.
110 Para 74 of the Phaswane decision.
111 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18 para 46.
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in our country, as well as the signiﬁcance of children’s rights as contained in
s 28 of Constitution,112 he explained that courts and reasonable observers are
obliged to give consideration to the effect of their decisions on the rights and
interests of children.113 In Yacoob J’s opinion, it was clear that s 28 of the
Constitution would require the reasonable observer to understand that the
applicants had the right to be cared for at the school; to be protected from
maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; and that the best interests of the
children are paramount in all matters concerning them.114 He found that it is
important to protect children from their own lack of judgement,115 given
their inclination to give confused messages, particularly in non-verbal
communication, and their ability to react, sometimes unreasonably, but
spontaneously and without thought, to the exercise of authority at any
institution.116 Consequently Yacoob J and Skweyiya J found117 the reasoning
of the Constitutional Court in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development & others118 to be of crucial importance in this
delictual setting (albeit that the context in the Centre for Child Law case was
that of criminal law proceedings). The court held in the Centre for Child Law
case that
‘[t]he Constitution draws this sharp distinction between children and adults not
out of sentimental considerations, but for practical reasons relating to children’s
greater physical and psychological vulnerability. . . . We distinguish them
because we recognise that children’s crimes may stem from immature judg-
ment, from as yet unformed character, from youthful vulnerability to error, to
impulse, and to inﬂuence. We recognise that exacting full moral accountability
for a misdeed might be too harsh because they are not yet adults. Hence we
afford children some leeway of hope and possibility.’119
As a result, Yacoob J found that the ‘reasonable observer would also try to
strike an appropriate balance between defamation and privacy concerns on
the one hand and freedom of expression and children’s rights on the other
hand’.120 This meant that the
112 Ibid paras 47–9.
113 Ibid para 74.
114 Ibid para 57.
115 See also Skweyiya J’s reasoning ibid para 212: ‘In effect, we seek to create
different ‘‘worlds’’ for our children in an effort to protect them, to help them develop,
and to give them a forum to make mistakes and then learn from these mistakes. One is
not hard-pressed to ﬁnd examples of ways in which we treat children differently, or
offer them greater protection. We give children a measure of leeway, and in many
instances hold them to a lower standard of account, as we accept that they lack the
emotional maturity and wisdom to clearly distinguish right from wrong when there is
a grey area. Inmy view, the facts of this case present such a grey area.’
116 Ibid para 57.
117 Ibid paras 50 and 212.
118 2009 (6) SA632 (CC) paras 26–8.
119 Ibid para 26.
120 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 18 para 57.
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‘reasonable observer would also recognise that over-sensitive reaction to the
conduct of immature children by people in authority at institutions at which
the children are, would result in the diminution of sensitivity to the needs and
requirements of children. In this sense the lack of sensitivity might be
counter-productive’121
and
‘an over-emphasis on the rights of a good name and reputation of a deputy
principal in relation to the rights of powerless children . . . will be harmful to
the interests of children.’122
Skweyiya J found it rather unreasonable that ‘precisely because they were
children, the learners have been subjected to an additional round of
punishment through the school’s disciplinary measures’.123 He also remarked
that in an environment such as a school, where children are supposed to be
taught right from wrong, fear of the law and the legal process should not be
instilled, and freedom of speech should be encouraged. When children
transgress, they should be held accountable in an appropriate and commensu-
rate manner. In some instances this may lead to their criminal and civil
liability, but in this particular instance Skweyiya doubted the efﬁcacy of
litigation and the monetary awards made against the children.124 Reacting to
the argument that the generally serious disciplinary problems in school
necessitated a strict approach,125 Yacoob J responded that there was no link to
be made between school discipline and defamation cases.126 Both Yacoob J
and Skweyiya J came to the conclusion that the image was neither
defamatory of nor injurious to Dr Dey’s dignity.127
V CONCLUSION
Ascertaining what it means to consider the best interests of the child of
paramount importance requires a continuous integration of children’s rights
into all aspects which affect them. It does not mean that children’s rights will
triumph over all other competing interests, but it does mean that children
should be recognised as rights holders. We need to move away from the
concept of child welfare rights and appreciate children’s rights and responsi-
bilities in all other contexts too — especially in relationships where children’s
rights have an impact on those of others. Children’s rights may, like any
fundamental right, of course be limited. However, in order to adjudicate the
extent of that limitation, these rights, ﬁrst and foremost, have to be
acknowledged. This acknowledgment should then be developed into an
121 Ibid para 57.
122 Ibid para 68.
123 Ibid para 214.
124 Ibid para 215.
125 Ibid para 67.
126 Ibid para 68.
127 Ibid para 78.
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assessment of the speciﬁc circumstances that make the child unique128 — of
all the factual circumstances regarding the child, including what elements
have been found to be relevant in the best-interests assessment. The content
of the elements must be explained in each individual case, and how they have
been weighed up to determine the child’s best interests.129 The explanation
must also demonstrate, in a credible way, why the best interests of the child
were not strong enough to outweigh other considerations in cases where this
is the ultimate result.130 This was not what the majority of the Constitutional
Court, or any of the lower courts in this matter understood their duty to be.
As I have argued above, to consider the children’s best interests in this
particular matter would not necessarily have resulted in the children escaping
delictual liability. On the contrary, the paramountcy of this principle cannot
simply justify the violation of someone else’s rights. However, like with all
other fundamental rights, it was essential that a proportionate balance of all
applicable rights had to be struck in order for the court to make its decision.
While it is certainly true that some aspects of the minority judgments of
Yacoob and Skweyiya JJ may be criticised,131 it cannot be denied that theirs
were the only judgments which approached the matter from the proper
perspective. I cannot agree with Buthelezi’s comment that Yacoob J ‘was
misdirected by his unwarranted bias towards the children’s rights’.132 Nor
can I approve of his submission that ‘the two justices failed to weigh properly
the competing interests — probably being blinded by the fact that the
applicants were minors’133 or the sentiment that Yacoob J portrayed the
children as helpless victims.134 Although I may agree with Buthelezi’s
assessment that it was not in the children’s interests ‘to absolve them from
liability for salvaging the dignity of others’,135 it should be emphasised that
only Yacoob and Skweyiya JJ truly comprehended what was required of
them. The other members of the judiciary involved in this matter, it is
respectfully submitted, failed to comply with international and national
legislative imperatives, failed to enhance and develop the common law, and
in the end failed these rather mischievous children who had made fun of their
teachers.
128 General CommentNo 14 op cit note 10 at 12.
129 Ibid at 20.
130 Ibid at 20.
131 See for example Buthelezi’s fairly detailed exposition op cit note 21. As I indi-
cated from the outset, the aim of this article is not to comment on the court’s pro-
nouncements on the particular aspects of the law of defamation, but rather to discuss
its approach to assess defamatory actions committed by children.
132 Buthelezi ibid at 723.
133 Ibid at 729.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid at 731.
(2014) 131 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL864
